In this paper, we analyze the risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging economies in a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through which depositors can exercise pressure to control risk taking. Depositors can reallocate their savings away from their home country to the more protective system of a developed economy. We recover a classical result according to which increased competition resulting from more international financial openness induces banks to take excessive risks. We find however that sufficiently high financial openness is necessary for a positive link between financial transparency and safe risk management. Finally, we test the relationship between disclosure, financial openness and bank risk-taking for a panel of 258 banks from the MENA region and Turkey.
Introduction
Efficient risk management in the banking sector is crucial for emerging economies 1 . Because of their highly uncertain environment, these countries are prone to information problems that may cause excessive risk-taking behavior in banking (Vives, 2006 ). This situation is further aggravated by the low development of their financial markets, which increases the role of banks. The intent of emerging countries to comply with advanced risk management procedures is nevertheless quite remarkable 2 condition of the attractiveness of oil surplus funds. 1 In this paper, the term emerging economies does not refer to a specific list of countries. Each international organization or rating agency uses its own classification. Due to the lack of a precise definition, we consider emerging economies to be developing countries that are not part of the "Least Developed Countries" group. Our model is adapted to economies characterized by increasing financial integration as well as by a weak financial environment and capital flight. 2 The 2008 FSI survey (FSI-BIS 2008, p. 2) indicates that 92 non-members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have implemented or are currently planning to implement Basel II. Moreover, 61 % of these non-members intend to offer the Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach (Advanced IRB). 3 The MENA region ranks second (behind East Asia) in banking sector development, according to the ratio of bank assets to GDP and the banking sector credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP over the period (Anzoategui et al., 2010 ).
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In this paper, we analyze how international competition for deposits may prevent excessive bank risk taking in emerging economies. In particular, we model pressure on the emerging banking system by possible capital outflows to a developed financial center. The quality of the financial environment is addressed by introducing the notion of transparency, defined as the ability of depositors to observe how prudently banks behave. In this paper, we propose international banking competition as a disciplinary device. Depositors may exert pressure on home banks by reallocating their savings to an external (i.e., foreign) banking system that is more protective. The disciplinary role of depositors on banks has been studied by Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Allen and Gale (1999), Chen (1999) and, from a critical view, Hellwig (2005) . The existing literature argues that depositors can punish banks by withdrawing their funds when they do not approve of the bank's behavior. This means of exerting discipline through depositors' behavior is well documented empirically in emerging economies. These studies test the reaction of depositors to high risk taking on the part of banks by analyzing changes in the volume of deposits and the corresponding interest rates. In Latin America, empirical evidence has been found by Barajas and Steiner (2000) for Colombia, by Calomiris and Powell (2001) It is generally argued that the effectiveness of such disciplining behavior crucially depends on the transparency of the banking system. It is also suggested that bank regula- 4 The increasing financial openness of emerging countries and its consequences have been well measured by Prasard et al. (2003) . With the exception of FDIs, capital has tended to flow from poor to rich countries over the 2000s (Prasad et al. 2006 The main theoretical results of this paper can be summarized as follows. In our model, which has been adapted to emerging countries, we recover a classical result according to which increased competition resulting from more international financial openness induces banks to take excessive risks. We find however that sufficiently high financial openness is necessary for a positive link between financial transparency and safe risk management.
Indeed, when there is a high degree of financial openness, profit margins are relatively low.
In this case, strong financial disclosure, which spurs competition, leads to weak losses. It follows that the attractiveness effect of transparency dominates and makes banks more likely to adopt safe risk management. The implication from the perspective of policy analysis is that promoting successful financial disclosure in an emerging country requires sufficient financial openness. 
The Model
Consider two countries h and f; where h is the emerging country and f is the developed one. Each country contains one banking system 5 . We assume that the emerging country is not attractive to investors in country h. This seems realistic enough due to weak investor protection prevailing in developing countries as already said in the introduction. However, depositors in the emerging region may decide to invest their savings in the developed country.
The population of depositors of the emerging country is uniformly distributed along the linear segment [0; 1] with density 1: The heterogeneity of these depositors captures their preference for proximity. Assume that the domestic bank that is located at position 0, and the foreign bank is located at position 1, which denotes the border between the emerging and developed countries. Then, the "closer" to the origin depositors are, the more they favor their home financial center. Consequently, the subjective mobility cost of an individual located at a distance x (x 2 [0; 1]) from the origin equals the gap 1 x that separates her from the border multiplied by a constant unit cost k. The higher this coefficient k is, the lower is the international mobility of investors. Hence k may also be used to measure the degree of international financial openness.
BANKS Banks offer an interest rate r i (i = h; f ) to depositors and lend the deposited funds out to borrowers. Like Chiesa (2001), we assume that lending consists of project fi-nancing. A bank is presumed to take excessive risks if it does not monitor the funded project.
Since we focus on the potential risk behavior within the emerging country, we assume without loss of generality that banks in the developed country do not take excessive risks 6 . More precisely, the bank in h chooses strategy s 2 fm; M g, where s = m stands for "excessive risk-taking" and s = M indicates "safe risk management" in the case of monitoring. We consider that choosing a safe risk management strategy M means complying with international prudential rules. Banks in both countries are supposed to be risk-indifferent and have limited liability. If action m is chosen, one unit of resources is invested in a portfolio that yields r with probability p m and is zero otherwise. Opting for M delivers a return r with probability p M , with p M > p m but it also entails a monitoring cost equal to c > 0 (with r > c) . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the action M eliminates the credit risk while action m does not 7 , that is p m = p and p M = 1. In what follows, we also assume
; 1 . Finally, we consider a deposit insurance scheme specific 8 to each country, in which a fraction i (i = h; f ) of deposits, 0 < i < 1 is refunded to depositors if a bank fails. Without loss of generality, we assume f = 1 and let h = . We suppose that implementing safe risk management is efficient 9 . This implies that 1 + r > c=(1 p).
TIMING
The timing of the model is shown in the following figure. Figure 1 At date 0 the banking sector in country h chooses a strategy s 2 fm; M g and at date
1 it states if it complies with international prudential standards (choice of s = M ) or it makes no statement. Banks in developing countries often have substantive implementation costs of international regulatory standards and resist to effective compliance (Walter, 2010) .
Officially reporting compliance does not therefore necessarily translate into facts and mock compliance (Walter, 2010 ) is very likely to occur. An additional complication is that real compliance is difficult to assess by outside observers (Walter, 2010) . This follows from the lack of skilled accounting and auditing professionals and the high cost in implementing international accounting and disclosure standards (United Nations, 2008). Financial systems in developing countries have thus low capacity to disclose relevant information to investors.
We model this imperfect transparency by considering like Schultz (2004) that the investors are composed of informed and uninformed agents. We assume that the informed investors represent a fraction (0 1). They are endowed with sufficiently high expert skill allowing them to exactly perceive the chosen risk strategy by the banking sector. The remaining fraction (0 1) are uninformed investors. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that these agents can by no means observe the actual risk behavior (M or m) chosen by the home banking sector. More precisely, they lack expert knowledge to such an extent that they think that mock compliance occurs when the banking sector officially states compliance with international standards. Missing information entices uninformed investors to be prudent and to assume the status quo in risk taking even if the bank announces compliance. We also assume that these investors are so unsophisticated that they are not able to extract valuable information about risk taking from interest rates. In the sequel we use the parameter as a proxy for the degree of financial transparency and we assume that the fraction of informed investors increases with the degree of financial disclosure.
At date 2, the investors choose where to invest according to their knowledge about the risk strategy chosen by their home country's banking sector. At date 3, the banking sectors compete by setting the deposit rates offered to the investors. Finally at date 4 the depositors' investments materialize. It follows that investors learn the risk strategy chosen by their home country bank after having deposited their money.
INVESTORS Investors select the country that offers the highest expected return net of mobility costs. The expected utility of "informed" investors located at x I ; x I 2 [0; 1] and who invest in their own country h is given by
If she invests in country f , her expected utility becomes
The expected utility of the uninformed investor located at x U ; x U 2 [0; 1] who invests in her own country h is given by
If the bank in the emerging country chooses strategy M , the marginal informed and uninformed investors' locations respectively become
The market share x M of the bank in country h if the prudent strategy is selected is obtained If there is no compliance reported by the jurisdiction h or if there is mock compliance, the bank in the emerging country takes excessive risk. The informed and uninformed investors will choose the destination of their investment consistently with the strategy m adopted by the domestic bank. The deposit supply faced by the bank in country h equals
Excessive risk-taking
Each banking system selects the interest rate that maximizes its own profit taking the rival's rate as given.
M ax
Solving the system of first order conditions yields the interest rates r 
The corresponding market share of h is
Consequently
Profits of banks in h and f can be written as
Sound risk management
Under sound risk management, the market share of the bank in the emerging country is given by (1) . Consequently, each bank selects the interest rate that maximizes its own profit by taking the rival's rate as given.
After solving the system of best replies, we obtain the following interest rates
10 The offered interest rates r m i (i = h; f ) are positively signed for a sufficiently large r.
11 As above, a sufficiently large r guaranties that r M i (i = h; f ) are positive.
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The corresponding market share of h becomes
which belongs to the interval (0; 1) if and only if k > k 2 =
(1 )(1+r c ) 2
.
The equilibrium profit functions are given by
Notice that decreasing transparency ( ) increases the profit function M h . The reason is that lower transparency softens international bank competition and makes depositors more captive.
Choice of risk management strategy
In this section, we study the incentives of the emerging country to comply with safe risk 
Proof:
The threshold-value c =
is derived from the equality kS
Consequently, the sound strategy M is chosen if the cost of monitoring is not too high (i.e. c c ), whereas the banking system opts for risk-taking (m) if c > c . The limiting case 12 Notice thatk is strictly positive if
havek < 0. In this case it follows that for any value of the net return 1 + r we get c > 0:
9 where depositors are uninsured ( = 0) in the emerging country and financial disclosure is perfect ( = 1), the banking system in country h always chooses safe risk management.
It is easy to show that @c =@k = Indeed, a higher degree of financial openness fuels banking competition and puts an upward pressure on the offered interest rates. Since we have j@r 
can thus state the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given sufficient financial openness, higher disclosure makes the emerging banking system more likely to opt for sound risk management. In contrast, if capital mobility is low, higher disclosure decreases the likeliness of sound risk management.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 3, we first totally differentiate the equality ; 13 Since we assume that p 2 1 2 ; 1 , it is easy to check that k > max k 1 ; k 2 and k >k. 14 The denominator equals Thus, increasing transparency has two opposite effects. On the one hand, banks have an incentive to behave more prudently, since higher transparency increases attractiveness to depositors. On the other hand, more transparency spurs bank competition 15 , which squeezes profit margins and thus leads to more bank risk-taking. Notice that the higher the mobility cost k, the stronger the profit squeeze 16 . Which effect will ultimately dominate depends on the degree of financial openness. When the level of financial openness is high (k < k ), the profit squeeze induced by higher transparency (increased ) is dominated by the attractiveness effect. However, when capital mobility is low (k > k ) the opposite happens.
Empirical Analysis

Estimated equation and data coverage
In this section, we test empirically how bank risk-taking in emerging economies may be affected by disclosure (Discl) and financial openness (Kaopen), giving empirical support to our results in Propositions 2 and 3. For this purpose, we estimate the following model for a cross country sample of banks :
where subscripts i and k refer to bank and country respectively, while X ik and X k are vectors of control variables at bank and country-level . 
Measuring disclosure
We 
Bank risk-taking variables
We The liquidity ratio is measured by liquid assets to total assets. Generally, banks with higher ratios are perceived as being safer because of the risk mitigating character of liquid assets which allow to meet unexpected withdrawals. Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004, p. 383) consider liquidity as one of the most reliable accounting measures of bank risk, in particular for the developing countries. Equity and profit ratios would be more subject to accounting manipulation and tend to be overstated at weak banks.
The leverage indicator is expressed as the ratio of total assets to total book equity capital.
Banks typically increase their risk-taking by borrowing to acquire more assets, with the aim of raising their return on equity. According to the Turner Report (FSA, 2009, p. 67), using 13 this leverage ratio in addition to liquidity is very important. Indeed, the crisis revealed that assets which are believed to be of the low risk type can become highly illiquid and risky when systemic problems emerge.
The z-score represents a universal measure of soundness in banking related studies. This index inversely proxies banks' failure probability. Its merit is to combine profitability, solvability and volatility in a relative simple measure solely based on accounting information. It is defined by:
;where ROA i is the period-average return on assets for bank i, E=T A i stands for the period average equity to total assets, and ROA i represents the standard deviation of ROA that captures the volatility of returns. The z-score increases with high profitability and capitalization levels and decreases in return volatility. Larger values of the z-score imply lower risk-taking and thus greater bank soundness.
Financial openness and control variables
To measure financial openness, which is a key variable of our theoretical model, only country- To isolate the impact of disclosure and financial openness on bank risk-taking (or soundness), we use a number of bank-level and country-level control variables. Empirical literature on bank risk-taking controls always for bank size which is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets. As noted by Gonzalez (2005) , the effect of the bank size is not easy to forecast because under a "too big to fail" behavior, larger banks may have greater incentives to take The indicators are the share of total loans in total assets and the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. They control for the difference in the structure of bank business. Traditionally, the public ownership of a bank is captured by a dummy variable set to 1 when government's ownership exceeds 50%.
To take into account the macroeconomic environment at the country-level, we control for the degree of economic development using the real GDP per capita, the real GDP growth and the inflation rate. Finally, in the MENA region, some economies are strongly resource-based (oil and gas exporters). For this reason, we introduce the dummy variable res that takes the value 1 for oil or gas exporters. Bank and country-level variables used in our empirical analysis are summarized in table 1. The descriptive statistics for bank-level variables and the correlations among variables are shown in Appendix 2. Table 2 presents the results for our main regressions. All of them are estimated using OLS, and standard errors are adjusted because of heteroscedasticity by the White method. In these equations, we regress risk-taking indicators (leverage) or soundness indicators (Liquidity and z-score) on financial openness, disclosure and control variables.
Results
In a nutshell, these regressions yield significant results with signs consistent with our theoretical model. We obtain more precise coefficients for liquidity and leverage equations than for z-score.
In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variables are measured over the period 2005-2007. In column (2) and (4) we repeat the same estimation by including 2008 which is the first year of the recent financial crisis. It appears that in both estimations the results are very close.
In line with proposition 2, we find that the financial openness proxy (KAOPEN) affects liquidity (the soundness indicator) negatively and leverage (the risk indicator) positively .
The financial openness variable is not significant in the z-score regression.
There is clear evidence that the disclosure index (in log) influences liquidity and z-score positively, and leverage negatively. These very significant results in all our regressions are consistent with proposition 3 according to which more disclosure increases the likeliness that the banking system opts for sound risk management in case of sufficient financial openness.
As regards the bank specific control variables, we find that higher bank size (log of total bank assets) is associated with relatively higher risk-taking and lower soundness. This evidence confirms the results obtained by the empirical literature on bank risk-taking. On the other hand, the banks'share in the total assets of their home (banking) sector is significant and negative only in the liquidity regression. The bank soundness, measured by liquidity seems to be affected by the structure of their balance sheet (share of total loans in total assets). Among the country-level characteristics, the dummy variable RES (oil and gas exporters) is significant in explaining bank-soundness and bank risk-taking which are respectively captured by liquidity and leverage. The annual GDP growth affects liquidity positively and leverage negatively. In addition, we find that higher per capita GDP is only consistent with lower liquidity. 344) consider that the endogeneity bias for disclosure variables is less plausible in a crosssectional setup. Nevertheless, we address this potential problem by using instrumental variables estimations (Two stages least squares) adapted to the existence of heteroskedasticity.
The choice of instruments is however relatively limited in a cross-sectional analysis. We tested a lot of bank level variables, including public ownership and foreign ownership, and country level variables of governance which may be correlated with our disclosure variable.
The only significant instrument we found is public ownership. 
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to analyze how international competition for deposits and information disclosure affects banks' risk-taking behavior in emerging countries. The model we develop is also tested econometrically using data on MENA countries.
Briefly, we build a model that indicates for which levels of financial openness and disclosure of information implementing international regulatory standards in developing and emerging countries is a winning strategy. One of our main results is that growing financial 
Appendix
The bank disclosure indexes measure the level of detail that banks provide on seventeen dimensions of accounting information in their published accounts and provided by Bankscope database. For all indexes, zero was assigned if there was no entry in any of the corresponding categories and 1 otherwise, except for the index for securities by "type" and the "capital"
index. For the "securities by type" item, a 0 was assigned if there was no entry for any of the associated disclosure categories, a 1 if there was only an entry for the coarse breakdown and a 2 if there was an entry for the detailed breakdown. For the "capital" item, a 0 was assigned if there was no entry in any of the categories, a 1 if there was one entry only, a 2 if there were two entries and a 3 if there were three or four entries. Aggregating the information scores on the 17 disclosure items, the composite index can be created with the following formula: Discl = 
